In Strauss Scholar Jeremi Suri’s article “American Grand Strategy from the Cold War’s End to 9/11,” Suri analyzes America’s “grand strategy,” defined as “the wisdom to make power serve useful purposes” in the period between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001.
In Strauss Scholar Jeremi Suri’s article “American Grand Strategy from the Cold War’s End to 9/11,” Suri analyzes America’s “grand strategy,” defined as “the wisdom to make power serve useful purposes” in the period between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001. Suri looks at the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton Administrations’ strategy formulation during this time period and discusses their shortcomings. According to Suri, the lack of effective strategy during the 1990’s contributed to the crises during the early twenty-first century.
After the Cold War, U.S. leaders and scholars conveyed an optimistic attitude about America’s abilities in international politics. Suri describes this “interwar” period as a time when America was convinced of its strong abilities, but in reality, agonized over interventions in places that were strategically not ideal. He defines the 1990’s as a decade “dominated by small policy decisions, misguided political controversies, and half measures.”
Suri concludes that neither H.W. Bush nor Clinton explained what they meant by rhetoric such as “Beyond Containment” and “New World Order.” Bush had “process without purpose” and Clinton had “purpose without process.” Neither leader created a substantive replacement to containment. Suri argues leaders in Washington during the time period failed to manage or classify the United States’ foreign relations, which lead to issues we faced in the turn of the twenty first century. He encourages readers to think about how future policymakers can do better than the leaders of the interwar period by prioritizing, and paying close attention to trade-offs and countries’ capabilities.
